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China’s consumption challenge

A panel of leading Chinese economists debates proposals to stoke private consumption in the world’s fastest-growing economy.

Bolstered by a $586 billion government stimulus program and a surge in lending by state-owned banks, China may be the first major economy to bounce back from the global recession. But the composition of China’s growth remains unbalanced. Aggressive increases in government spending and investment by state-owned enterprises has cushioned the impact of weak exports. But those gains have not been matched by comparable increases in private consumption. Spending by Chinese households as a percentage of GDP is roughly half the US consumption ratio and remains significantly below private spending levels in Europe and Japan. And despite rising sales of items such as automobiles and household appliances, the ratio of private spending to GDP in China today has actually fallen relative to Chinese spending levels of a decade ago.

Why do Chinese consumers spend so little relative to counterparts in other nations? What can be done to change that? Is boosting private consumption in China’s national interest? How would that contribute to global growth? In this interview, conducted by McKinsey director Jonathan Woetzel in June 2009 in Shanghai, four distinguished members of the McKinsey China Council of Business Economists1 explore these questions. Watch the video, or read the transcript below.

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Video: China’s consumption challenge
A panel of economists debates measure to jump-start China’s private consumption

Jonathan Woetzel: Private consumption accounts for only about 36 percent of China’s GDP. That’s about half of what it is in the United States. It’s almost two-thirds of what it is in Europe. Is that too low? Why is it that low?

Wang Xiaolu: It seems to me there are several reasons. One is that China doesn’t have a complete social-security system. By 2007, only one-third of the urban population was covered by the social-security system. And for rural residents, most of them don’t have social security. And also in past years, the cost for education, for medication, for housing has increased quite rapidly—much more rapidly than GDP growth and income growth.

Jonathan Woetzel: What’s a proper, or normal, consumption level for China?

Cao Yuanzheng: According to the historical levels [for China], the consumption share in terms of GDP is over 50 percent. So if we set this as a standard, we can see there is a gap by 15 percent and more. So we have to make some policies to try to narrow this gap.

Jonathan Woetzel: What kind of policies? What could you do? If you were in the Chinese government’s position, what would you do to narrow the gap?

Li Xiaoxi: Income allocation has a significant impact on consumption. The government needs to make some adjustments to reallocate income distribution—how much goes to citizens, how much to governments, and how much to enterprises. This is a macroeconomic adjustment that can be achieved with new fiscal policies, including changes in tax policy.

Bai Chong’en: I think it is very important to increase the income share of households. Without income, no matter what happens, households just don’t have the means to consume.

Jonathan Woetzel: What’s the relationship between the social safety net and consumption?

Bai Chong’en: I actually think that the relationship is not as simple as a lot of people think. And it’s not necessarily that when we increase spending on social security, private consumption will increase. I think the answer depends on how social security is financed.

We did a study on rural healthcare. Rural health insurance is subsidized by the government. So there is no crowding out. The rural residents don’t need to spend a lot to purchase insurance. In that case, we found that, indeed, consumption is increased. But I’m not so sure about urban social security, because social security is mainly financed by payroll tax. And the tax rate is too high. We have five different insurances. And if you add them together, the tax on labor income is around 40 percent.

Forty percent tax on labor income is a lot. That kind of tax crowds out private consumption. And I believe the government should force the state-owned enterprises—especially those with monopoly power—to pay dividends to the government, and use those proceeds to finance social security.

Jonathan Woetzel: What are some of the very short-term policies—things that you could do in the next six months—that would move us toward higher consumption?

Li Xiaoxi: In the short term, we’ve already implemented many measures. For example, we tried to boost sales of home appliances and other durable goods in rural areas by offering them at discount prices subsidized by the government. We hope, by doing so, those items will be more affordable to farmers. Another short-term measure is consumer credit policy, which has been loosened to encourage consumption.

Cao Yuanzheng: Since China is a developing country, that means most of the population is concentrated in the countryside. So how to increase this part of the economy is very important. Long-term and short-term policies have to concentrate on this side.

Wang Xiaolu: It seems to me that the more basic problem is widening income disparity. We know that high-income people have a much higher savings rate compared with low-income people.

Bai Chong’en: In order to have urbanization and industrialization, we need to create more nonagricultural jobs. And on this front, we are not doing so well. And employment growth in the industrial sector lags far behind GDP growth. When you have 40 percent payroll tax on labor income, that suppresses employment.

Li Xiaoxi: The global financial crisis has made our unemployment situation even worse with factory closures and bankruptcy in the southeast coastal area. Many migrant workers who used to work in the Yangtze River Delta and Pearl River Delta had to return home to the midwest. Helping them to find new jobs is critical for boosting domestic consumption.

Wang Xiaolu: Currently, there are something around 140 million migrant workers coming from rural areas to work in urban areas. But they are just temporary workers. They can’t find good accommodation to house their family, to settle down in urban areas. And also, the current education system makes some trouble for their children to be educated in urban areas because they have to pay. Therefore, to accelerate urbanization, you need some policy adjustments to provide a better living environment for migrant workers.

Jonathan Woetzel: It seems we’re talking about a lot of measures to spend money on workers, to reduce payroll taxes. Can the Chinese government afford to increase consumption?

Bai Chong’en: You ask a very good question: where does the money come from? One source is the profit of state-owned enterprises, especially those with monopoly power. When we talk about savings, actually the largest share of savings increase is in the corporate sector. And these savings were not controlled. They were invested in low-efficiency projects. So if the government forces these firms to pay higher dividends, it’s actually one stone that kills two birds. One, you use the money to finance the social-security system. Therefore, you have room to reduce payroll tax. Second, you strip the money away from the state-owned enterprises so that their ability to invest is mitigated.

Jonathan Woetzel: Is this a good time for China to be increasing consumption?

Cao Yuanzheng: You know, we have to. Because there’s no way out. We have to enhance domestic consumption. I think everyone now understands that.

Bai Chong’en: Right. I totally agree with Dr. Cao that that’s the only way. You cannot increase net export that rapidly anymore. And you cannot increase investment that rapidly anymore. So that only leaves consumption.

Li Xiaoxi: We have reached a consensus on the need to boost domestic consumption, but the path we are taking is a zigzag. To cope with the crisis, we have to start with increasing investment. About 30 percent of the investment will eventually end up in consumption. But between consumption and investment expansion, the government is more skilled at increasing investment to stimulate the economy. Therefore, it is a zigzag route rather than a one-leap jump.

Wang Xiaolu: I think in the short term, investment projects are necessary because consumption increases may take a long time. But I think we need to consider more about how to balance consumption and investment.

Bai Chong’en: Normally, there is a saying that when per capita income goes beyond $3,000, then consumption will pick up rapidly. China is moving toward that threshold. However, this conventional wisdom may not give us so much optimism, because usually, the consumption increase comes from housing and comes from automobiles. And in both of these fronts, we cannot follow the Western model, especially the US model. Recently, automobile sales have been increasing very rapidly—to everybody’s surprise. I don’t think that’s a very good sign. We just don’t have so much oil available to let every Chinese household have a private car and drive on gasoline.

Jonathan Woetzel: Let’s say China does decide to increase consumption, what does that mean for the rest of the world? How does China affect the global economy?

Bai Chong’en: I think the world faces a big challenge. The world expects Chinese consumers to pick up and to fill the void left behind by the US and European consumers. That’s not very realistic. Also, Chinese consumption will have to be different from American consumption and European consumption.

Li Xiaoxi: China’s consumption should increase incrementally, not drastically. A dramatic jump in Chinese consumption is not necessarily a good thing, as the global economy is so interdependent. Some people suggest that if China consumes all the goods, there will be nothing left for export.

If China doesn’t export that much, it won’t have much cash to buy T-bonds from the US. Some people seem to assume that China can consume more and at the same time keep buying US bonds. It’s difficult to have your cake and eat it too. In the interdependent global economy, we should keep cool-headed.

Jonathan Woetzel: I guess building on that, does more Chinese consumption mean more Chinese imports?

Bai Chong’en: I don’t think it’s appropriate to say what is the right level of consumption in China. You never know. Different nations have different cultures, and the demographics are also different. The Chinese population is rapidly aging. That makes it necessary for us to save. So my view is that as long as we get rid of some of the structural failures or institutional problems that suppress consumption, then we are OK.

Wang Xiaolu: I think in the coming 10 or 20 years, urbanization will still play a crucial role in China’s economic development. In the past period, [we had] basically a one percentage-point increase each year in the urbanization ratio. And currently the urbanization rate is only 45 percent. [China could] achieve 70 percent of people living in urban areas. We still have a long way to go.

Jonathan Woetzel: What should companies do—companies that target the Chinese consumer? Is now the time to invest, or should they be waiting to see what happens?

Li Xiaoxi: If I’m a business consultant, I would advocate “Green Consumption.” I don’t know if there is such a term in English, but I believe this will become a very critical term in the future. This is one of the areas where China and the US can do a lot together, and there is great room for global cooperation as well.

Bai Chong’en: The old consumption pattern cannot be sustained any more. The main idea now is how to create consumption for all these consumers—from China, India, and from other countries—given our resource constraints, given our environmental constraints. That’s the biggest challenge to the world.

Jonathan Woetzel: Gentlemen, thank you very much.

Notes

1 The McKinsey China Council of Business Economists is an organization of leading economists dedicated to promoting dialogue and understanding of the Chinese economy. The four panelists in this roundtable include Wang Xiaolu, deputy director at the China Reform Foundation’s National Economic Research Institute; Cao Yuanzheng, chief economist of Bank of China International Holdings; Bai Chong’en, professor and chair of the Department of Economics at Tsinghua University; and Li Xiaoxi, director of Beijing Normal University’s Institute of Economic and Resource Management.

Recommend (67)
  • 28 AUGUST 2009
    Su Yan
    The Chinese University of Hong Kong
    Hong Kong

    Did we consider what’s been said or quoted with what’s actually been done or is being done? Take a social safety net as an example....

    .
    Su Yan
    The Chinese University of Hong Kong
    Hong Kong

    Did we consider what’s been said or quoted with what’s actually been done or is being done? Take a social safety net as an example. Is it the real case in China that rural people get subsidized by the government for ailments or diseases? In addition, it appears to me that the real problem for the provision of such a safety net in urban areas is not how high the payroll tax reaches, but instead compared to what is being charged to individual tax payers, and what is being offered? Taking into account such disparities between the offerings and price tags, I don’t see any reason for the Chinese people to engage in substantial consumption.

    .
    OUR REPLY
    MKQ_response

    McKinsey director Jonathan Woetzel responds:

    Mr. Yan, Thank you for your comments. You may be interested to read our full report, “If you’ve got it, spend it: Unleashing the Chinese consumer,” where we do indeed note that, in reality, the Chinese government does not subsidize a social safety net. There are some initial pilots underway, however, where local governments provide subsidies to rural residents in particular, such as the New Cooperative Medical Scheme.

    I would also argue that the question isn’t whether or not the Chinese people have a “reason to increase consumption,” It’s whether they have the ability. Chinese consumers, for example, frequently have to forgo healthcare because they flat out can’t pay for it—those who can afford healthcare already foot 70 percent of the bill themselves. And healthcare costs are rising faster than incomes, independent of service levels. Whether that spend is going towards primary care, emergency care, or insurance, it is a burden that is growing too fast to be sustainable for the average Chinese consumer.

    OUR REPLY
  • 26 AUGUST 2009
    Jiani Wu
    Research Economist
    Business and Economic Research Limited
    New Zealand

    I would like to know how the 40% labour income tax is calculated. Any links to the tax agent Web site would be appreciated.

    .
    Jiani Wu
    Research Economist
    Business and Economic Research Limited
    New Zealand

    I would like to know how the 40% labour income tax is calculated. Any links to the tax agent Web site would be appreciated.

    .
    OUR REPLY
    MKQ_response

    Bai Chong’en, professor and chair of the Department of Economics at Tsinghua University, replies:

    Different regions may have different social insurance payment rates, but there is a payment guideline set by the central government. The 40 percent rate is estimated according to the guideline. These payments are not called taxes and are generally not collected by the tax agency; they are rather collected and administered by the local branches of Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. Detailed information can be found at http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/Desktop.aspx?PATH=/sy/ywzn/shbx.

    I hope this explanation is useful.

    OUR REPLY
  • 23 AUGUST 2009
    Andre Wirjo
    Student
    LSE
    London, UK

    ...Considering that 70 percent of its assets are already dollar-denominated, I don’t quite understand why China would still want to continue buying more T-bonds...

    .
    Andre Wirjo
    Student
    LSE
    London, UK

    Interesting viewpoints on the current state of the Chinese economy as well as its accompanying challenges. One particular comment made by Dr Li Xiaoxi caught my attention. Dr Li stated that if China doesn’t export that much, it won’t have much cash to buy T-bonds from the US.

    Considering that 70 percent of its assets are already dollar-denominated, I don’t quite understand why China would still want to continue buying more T-bonds because doing so will only mean falling further into the so-called “dollar trap”. Any fall in the value of dollar, just like the one that happened recently, will result in nothing but huge capital loss for the Chinese. Rationally, the Chinese Government should look at diversifying its assets instead of buying more T-bonds and bills from the US.

    As a matter of fact, in late March 2009, Mr Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of China Central Bank seemed to acknowledge that China is in a dollar trap when he made his SDR proposal. Based on Mr Zhou’s statement, one would think that it is a hint that the Chinese Government will be moving away from investing in dollar-denominated assets. It thus isn’t logical for the Chinese Government to be doing the exact opposite, which is to buy even more T-bonds.

    .
    OUR REPLY
    MKQ_response

    McKinsey director Jonathan Woetzel responds:

    Mr. Wirjo, I tend to agree with you, and the Chinese government has recently taken small steps to decrease its dependence on the US dollar. However, as I understand it (and I am not an economist, admittedly), there is really no other major market in which China may diversify. The US dollar is still the world’s major reserve currency—this is precisely why it’s called a dollar “trap,” because it’s so difficult to get out. China’s alternatives—which include moving to the Euro or some other currency in order to diversity its reserve currency, or to stop accumulating reserves altogether—would both likely result in a weaker dollar and more pressure on the Renminbi. As the value of the dollar drops (basically, as dollars flood into the system and are not “mopped up” by China for reserve accumulation), China would rack up significant losses on its existing dollar reserves.

    OUR REPLY
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